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Conflict of Laws and Insolvency Coordination: an Introduction
123
 
 
1 The coordination of legal systems has been a subject of discussion and innovation 
for legislators, political leaders, legal academics and businessmen for centuries, 
particularly with the aim of facilitating business across borders in order to 
maximise the economic benefits of international trade. The lex mercatoria has 
persisted since the Middle Ages as a form of private international law aimed at 
facilitating cross-border trade. It provides a body of rules and principles, distinct 
from the ordinary laws of a single jurisdiction, which developed from a need for 
simplified financial transactions that avoided risk of transporting hard currency 
over the long distances travelled by merchants to partake in regional faires and 
markets throughout Europe. These rules aimed to create a framework within which 
commercial transactions between travelling merchants could take place. While 
commercial rules in Europe have never been completely uniform, the lex 
mercatoria offered a means of coordinating the trading customs among different 
countries
4
 without recourse to specific legal rules. International trade continues to 
                                                 
* Jennifer Gant is a Casual Lecturer at the Nottingham Law School and Research Assistant in the 
Centre for Business and Insolvency Law. She is currently writing up her PhD in insolvency, 
employment and comparative law under the supervision of Professors David Burdette and Paul Omar. 
1 A substantial part of the inspiration for this article is derived from the Edwin Coe Lecture given by 
Professor Ian Fletcher entitled: “Spreading the Gospel: The Mission of Insolvency Law and Insolvency 
Practitioners in the early 21st century”, delivered on 26 September 2013 at the INSOL Europe 
Academic Forum Conference held in Paris, France. 
2 Part of the content in this article was delivered in a presentation at the INSOL International Academic 
Colloquium Annual Conference in Hong Kong in March 2014 based on a paper entitled “Obstacles to 
Cross-border Insolvency and Employment Protection Coordination in the EU: Examples from the UK 
and France”. 
3 The author would like to thank the anonymous referees for comments on the article. All remaining 
errors are the author’s own. 
4 W. Mitchell, An Essay on the Early History of the Law Merchant (1904, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge), at 10. 
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be governed by customary rules derived from the lex mercatoria, transcending 
traditional state law and municipal legal forms and institutions.
5
 These norms are 
now supplemented by international legal rules set by organisations such as the 
World Bank, UNIDROIT,
6
 UNCITRAL
7
 and the International Labour 
Organisation. Though such transnational norms tend to have no effective 
enforcement mechanism, they have helped to align legal systems to the extent that 
they have aided the development of a reasonably productive and effective European 
and, indeed, global marketplace. Where businesses exist, so too do business 
failures. Thus, a fundamentally essential element of international trade norms is the 
coordination of rules on the insolvency of companies engaging in cross-border 
trade. 
 
2 While easing the mode of business transactions across-borders, norms of 
international trade have not necessarily facilitated the coordination of legal decision 
making and enforcement as these activities are inextricably tied into the legal 
culture of a jurisdiction and often carry with them a sense of judicial self-
importance. This is particularly relevant for insolvency cases as they will often 
have assets, subsidiaries, employees or other associations in multiple jurisdictions 
and may therefore need to interact with multiple courts. In order to accomplish a 
level of coordination that would avoid overly complex and costly cross-border 
procedures, it was necessary to create sets of norms that would facilitate the 
resolution of legal conflicts. The establishment of jurisdiction and the coordination 
of judicial decision-making for cross-border legal problems began with interstate 
agreements creating rules to deal with the conflict of laws, in order to guarantee the 
uniformity of decisions and legal certainty across the states party to this or that 
international agreement.
8
 There has been a steady development of arguments in 
favour of the uniformity of rules, universality of application and the coordination of 
laws at an international level which, for insolvency procedures, helps by avoiding a 
proliferation of procedures that would be costly for the company and reduce returns 
to creditors.
9
 
 
3 Within the European Union,
10
 coordination and uniformity have been achieved to 
some extent in those legal areas that deal with the free movement of goods and 
capital in pursuit of free trade within the Common Market. The European 
                                                 
5 N. Hatzimihail, “The many Lives – and Faces – of Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy in 
International Business Law” (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 169-190, at 171. 
6 The Rome International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. 
7 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. 
8 P. Neuhaus, “Legal Certainty versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws” (1963) 28(4) Law and 
Contemporary Problems 795-807, at 798. 
9 P. Omar, “Jurisdictional Criteria and Paradigms in International Insolvency Texts” (2012) 12(1) 
Insolvency Law Journal 7-27. 
10 Hereafter referred to as the “EU”. 
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Insolvency Regulation
11
 is one of many attempts to coordinate the way in which 
Member States work together in cross-border business relationships. While the EIR 
has set out rules through which cross-border insolvencies can be managed, there 
remain gaps between individual insolvency systems that make it more difficult to 
coordinate insolvency procedures than if they were more closely aligned. Despite 
hard and soft law attempts to engender coordination, the mutual trust required 
remains difficult to capture. There are a number of reasons for this, not least of 
which are the pre-existing differences in insolvency law and procedures among the 
Member States. Disparities between the nature and standards of organisation, 
training and regulation of professionals and courts add additional obstacles, all of 
which adversely affect the effective coordination of insolvency systems by creating 
an atmosphere of mistrust due to the divergent characteristics of Member State 
legal systems and a resulting perceived imbalance in Common Market competition 
of Member State legal systems.
12
 In addition, due to factors specific to each 
jurisdiction, differing fundamental aims of insolvency present an obstacle to cross-
border cooperation. Disparities in the aims of regulation tend to be influenced by 
factors that go beyond legal rules and political position of the jurisdiction in 
question. They are influenced by factors endemic to the jurisdictions within which 
they are found, reliant upon the historical paths upon which legal developments 
have trod over time. 
 
4 What is the explanation of the idiosyncratic disparities between insolvency 
systems and is there any way that they can be aligned in spite of them? Why is it 
that if all Member States wish to promote effective and profitable cross-border 
business transactions that aligning those systems under which such transactions 
operate is such a difficult problem to address and resolve? This may seem a naive 
question, but trite answers will not assist on the way to better coordination. As 
such, a deeper analysis of the sources of the obstacles to legal coordination may 
help to elucidate the reasons why such obstacles exist and in so doing, perhaps 
make it possible to promote a closer alignment that can account for systemic 
differences when drafting or reforming coordinating legislation rather than 
attempting to force them into a common perspective. The jurisdiction specific 
characteristics that form the foundation upon which socio-economic, cultural and 
historical obstacles are rooted were referred to implicitly in Professor Ian Fletcher’s 
Edwin Coe lecture, given at the INSOL Europe Academic Forum Paris conference 
in 2013, out of which was borne the inspiration for this investigation. While 
acknowledging that obstacles exist that inhibit coordination of insolvency laws at 
                                                 
11 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L 160/1 
(hereafter referred to as the “EIR”). 
12 I. Fletcher QC, “Spreading the Gospel: the Mission of Insolvency Law, and the Insolvency 
Practitioner, in the Early Twenty-First Century”, Chapter 17 in The Grand Project: Reform of the 
European Insolvency Regulation: Papers from the INSOL Europe Academic Forum and Academy of 
European Law Joint Insolvency Conference Trier, Germany, 18-19 March 2013 and the INSOL 
Europe Academic Forum Annual Conference Paris, France 25-26 September 2013 (2014, INSOL 
Europe, Nottingham and Paris) 193-210, at 200. 
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the EU level is a starting place to a broader perspective of the problem, a deeper 
understanding of the path dependent legal developments of the jurisdictions that are 
gathered under the coordinating rules of the EIR may assist in understanding the 
deep culturally related obstacles preventing a more reliable form of mutual trust 
and, in so doing, reveal potential new paths toward more effective universalism in 
the coordination of insolvency proceedings. 
 
5 There are complex factors that exist within the legal, political, cultural, social and 
economic histories of each Member State that contribute to the diversity of aims of 
legal regulation. These unique historical experiences influence the developmental 
path of individual legal systems. While insolvency laws are influenced by a myriad 
of historical, social, economic and political characteristics, the focus of this treatise 
will be the path dependent influence of social policy and regulation on the legal 
development of insolvency law and the aims that individual jurisdictions ascribe to 
it. This will provide a snapshot of a far more complex framework that can explain 
how along just a single thread of historical development, a whole area of law can be 
fundamentally affected and differentiated from parallel developments in another 
legal system. There is a complexity of diverse legal development in the social 
policies and regulation of Member States, which has an effect on the aims of 
insolvency law in the relative weight of protection given to creditors and 
employees. By way of example, the United Kingdom
13
 and France will be used as 
comparators. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework: Path Dependency 
 
6 A comparison of a civil law and common law system cannot be made without 
some reference to differences arising from legal origins. While the basis of this 
treatise is examining a far wider perspective of influences on legal development, a 
country’s legal origin has an important role to play in these developments as well. 
The structure of a legal system influences how social control is applied to economic 
life
14
 and can influence national regulatory styles,
15
 which will affect jurisdictional 
approaches to the development of legal rules. In general it has been observed that 
common law systems are more likely to produce efficient rules for the governance 
of business enterprises than civil law systems and are less interventionist in their 
regulatory style. However, there are other historical and cultural factors that have a 
fundamental influence on the regulatory styles, particular to each jurisdiction.
16
 The 
                                                 
13 Hereafter referred to as the “UK”. 
14 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silenes and A. Shleifer, “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins” 
(2008) 42(2) Journal of Economic Literature 285-332, at 286. 
15 S. Deakin, P. Lele and M. Siems, “The Evolution of Labour Law: Calibrating and Comparing 
Regulatory Regimes” (2007) 46(3-4) International Labour Review 133-162, at 133. 
16 B. Ahlering and S. Deakin, “Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal  
Origin: a Case of Institutional Complementarity?” (2007) 41(4) Law & Society Review 895-908, at 
867. 
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theory of legal origins attempts to explain differences in regulatory style through an 
examination of the systemic differences between common law and civil law systems 
and has done so through a number of empirical observations.
17
 
 
7 While true that the legal origins of a jurisdiction will form a fundamental basis 
upon which legal systems evolve, understanding the reasons why differences in 
legal systems persist in modern Western cultures in this globalised economic world 
view cannot be explained only by examining legal origins in isolation. Not every 
civil system underwent the same historical experiences and thus will have evolved 
with different trajectories that cannot be explained by narrow view of legal origins 
alone. It is therefore necessary to delve deeper into the socio-cultural, political 
economic and historical factors that have led to the current state of the law to fully 
understand why it is the way that it is. There are too many other variables that the 
legal origins theory has failed to account for, making the theory unviable for broad 
application without qualification. 
 
8 According to Richard Posner, law is the most historically oriented, backward 
looking and path dependent of the professions, venerating tradition, precedent, 
custom, ancient practices and texts, wisdom and an interpretative method that is 
inextricably linked to its history. The characteristic gerontocracy of the profession 
relies upon ingrained attitudes that are obstacles to any attempt to reorient the law 
to a more pragmatic, and for the purpose of this treatise, coordinated and efficient 
direction.
18
 The fundamental dependence of the law on its history is evident in how 
precedent functions in common law systems and how codes drafted decades or 
more in the past continue to provide the foundation of civil law systems.
19
 While 
the historical dependence of law is self-evident, its context in the wider history of a 
jurisdiction also plays an important role in how law develops. 
 
9 The object of this article is to explore the historical context of social policy in the 
UK and France and analyse how it has influenced their approaches to insolvency 
law and corporate rescue. This methodological approach is based on the concept of 
path dependence, a theory suggesting that established traditional legal approaches 
to resolving legal problems will determine how new situations are dealt with in the 
present and in the future.
20
 Decisions made by legislators or judges are shaped in 
specific and systemic ways by the historical path leading up to them.
21
 Thus legal 
developments can be explained by reference not only to the specific characteristics 
of the legal system, but also by superimposing the social and economic pressures 
                                                 
17 Ibid., at 867. 
18 R. A. Posner, “Past-Dependency, Pragmatism and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal 
Scholarship” (2000) 67(3) The University of Chicago Law Review 573-606, at 873. 
19 O. A. Hathaway, “Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a 
Common Law System” (2000) 86 Iowa Law Review 601-665, at 601. 
20 J. Bell, “Path Dependence and Legal Development” (2012) 87 Tulane Law Review 787-810, at 787-
788. 
21 Hathaway, above note 19, at 604. 
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operating on the law from the outside as well as the established, perhaps culturally 
motivated, ways of dealing with legal issues within the system. While economic 
and social conditions may be similar in different countries, the differences in the 
paths on which legal systems have journeyed are not. An understanding of extra-
legal factors connected to a country’s history will assist in explaining why they do 
not approach similar, new problems in the same way.
22
 This theory adds to the legal 
origins hypothesis, which is too narrow to adequately explain all legal differences. 
 
10 Path dependency thus demonstrates how history influences the process of legal 
change and implies that the events of an earlier point in time affect the possible 
outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.
23
 There is a 
certain Darwinian effect here, as essentially the success of an outcome in the past 
will lead to similar choices in the future, theoretically common to differential 
reproductive success in evolutionary theory.
24
 This is particularly illustrative of UK 
legal development, though it does share some elements with the French, which 
reflects more of a “punctuated equilibria” of legal development. This second strand 
of evolutionary path dependence is reminiscent of the long periods of French status 
quo punctuated by periods of explosive revolution, similar in biology to periods of 
rapid adaptation in which changes occur only in fits and starts. Both the UK and 
France exhibit elements of both of these strands of evolutionary path dependency, 
but historically the French have experienced far more explosive change in their 
society and legal developments (consider that France has changed its Constitution 
no less than a dozen times since 1791). However, it is submitted that on the whole, 
“legal evolution” exhibits a combination of the two, but fundamentally, it is directly 
constrained by history. The legal possibilities for today and for the future are 
determined by the evolutionary changes of the past, whether slow and steady or 
explosive and revolutionary. Given the close, if frequently adversarial, relationship 
that the UK and France have historically shared, and the fact that both have 
exercised considerable influence in the EU through which insolvency coordination 
is meant to flow, they present two archetypal examples of how a state’s historical 
roots influence its approach to legal problems, such as resolving business failure in 
an economically efficient manner, and the potential obstacles to legal reform that 
aims to achieve closer coordination in this area. 
 
11 Before delving into the specific paths that this treatise intends to explore with a 
view to explaining the differences in current social policy regulation as it intersects 
with the procedures of corporate rescue and insolvency, a brief overview of the 
context of social policy in insolvency is required. This permits paths to be drawn 
from the historical descriptions that follow to the parallel analysis in the concluding 
remarks that will illuminate the evolutionary intersections in today’s British and 
                                                 
22 Bell, above note 20, at 787-788. 
23 W. Sewell, “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology”, in W. Sewell, Logics of History: 
Social Theory and Social Transformation (2005, University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 81-124. 
24 See C. Darwin, On the Origin of Species (1859) (2008, Oxford University Press, Oxford). 
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French insolvency systems. 
 
 
Social Policy, Insolvency and Corporate Rescue 
 
Regulatory Competence of Social Policy in the EU 
 
12 Social policy has had an influence on the aims of regulation throughout the EU, 
particularly since the end of the Second World War. The individual character of 
social policy is evident in the hands-off approach taken by EU social legislation, 
which has had consequences for the implementation of any legislation having a 
social consideration. Insolvency laws are one of those areas where social 
considerations arise as the outcomes of insolvency procedures will impact 
individuals, small businesses and communities within which struggling businesses 
are located. 
 
13 The EIR,
25
 while attempting to coordinate procedures for cross-border 
insolvency, leaves the procedures of each jurisdiction intact, relying upon mutual 
trust among judges, legal professionals, businesses and citizens to achieve its ends. 
The principle of mutual trust in insolvency coordination requires minimum 
standards and an understanding of the different legal traditions and methods among 
the Member States.
26
 The level of protection afforded to employees, creditors, 
shareholders and other stakeholders continues to vary, creating the environment of 
mistrust owing to perceived unfairness between insolvency systems and the 
imbalance in competition it creates. It has been accepted that for the time being a 
European insolvency regulation imposing procedural norms across all Member 
States is not possible owing to the individual character of state insolvency regimes 
and the aims that influence them to which Member States remain attached. The 
disparity between insolvency systems therefore continues to be an obstacle to 
effective coordination. 
 
14 The individual character of regulatory regimes protected by EU legislative 
methods also means that the differences in protective labour legislation remain 
diverse. If one examines this in the context of cross-border insolvency, the fact that 
the EIR leaves the determination of employment rights and obligations to the law of 
the Member State applicable to the employment relationship, an important factor of 
insolvency is left uncoordinated.
27
 Employees enjoy a super-priority in some 
jurisdictions, such as France, which means that employee claims are accorded a 
                                                 
25 The text was recently the subject of an update published in 2015, due to come into force in 2017. 
26 European Commission, COM (2010) 171 Final, 20.4.2010, Section 4, “Strengthening confidence in 
the European judicial area”, available at: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0171:FIN:EN:PDF> (last viewed 
6 February 2014).  
27 R. van Galen et al., Revision of the European Insolvency Regulation: Proposals by INSOL Europe 
(2012, INSOL Europe, Nottingham), at 23. 
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greater preference over even the secured creditors as they benefit from a general 
lien over an employer’s property in respect of unpaid wages. In the UK, employees 
also enjoy a preference, but this is severely restricted in relation to the amount that 
they can recover from the national guarantee fund
28
 when their employer is 
insolvent, after which any leftover claims rank in common with unsecured claims. 
However, a number of other countries fall between these extremes, but deal with 
employee claims in very different ways, which may result in claims being covered 
by part employer funded guarantee fund that secures all employee claims in some 
jurisdictions. 
 
15 European Directives also receive differential treatment on implementation. For 
example the application of acquired rights legislation in each Member State, though 
governed by the Acquired Rights Directive 2001,
29
 remains diverse in relation to 
how employees are treated in insolvency. In addition, redundancy and dismissal 
laws will affect the financial success of corporate rescue procedures depending 
upon the level of protection given to employees in these situations. Acquired rights 
and collective redundancy provisions also provide for protective awards in the 
event that procedural consultation and information obligations are not met, which 
can add another sometimes significant level of costs that may hinder rescue 
procedures and reduce distributions to creditors in liquidation procedures. 
 
16 While true that the EU Treaties have so far left the competence to regulate 
social policy to the Member States,
30
 since the Lisbon strategy of 2000 there has 
been a push to modernise the European social model by investing in human 
resources and combating social exclusion. However, these exhortations were lost in 
the financial crisis and Member State adherence to their sovereignty over social 
policy has thus far triumphed.
31
 In addition, the framework of the Europe 2020 
strategy envisages further flexibilisation of the labour market that is to be achieved 
through interstate coordination and soft law initiatives. The methods have generally 
been shown to be less than effective in achieving truly closer coordination in social 
policy. Member States are looking to their own internal social problems in the still 
rippling wake of the financial crisis, particularly those countries that were forced to 
resort to loans from the famed troika of the International Monetary Fund, European 
Central Bank and the European Commission. The financial crisis has brought 
individual countries back into their protective shields of history and culture, making 
the path dependent nature of law and society all the more apparent. Thus, diverse 
                                                 
28 Provided for by Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employee. 
29 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, Official Journal L 082/16 (22 March 2001). 
30 K-J. Bieback, “Harmonisation of Social Policy in the European Community” (1991) 32(4) Les 
Cahiers de Droit 913-935, at 916. 
31 G. Ross, “The Revenge of Neglected Issues: EU Founders and Social Policy” (2011) 29(2) French 
Politics, Culture and Society 90-104, at 95-100. 
  Gant: Path-Dependent Obstacles 109 
 
social policy regulation among the Member States remains an obstacle to regulatory 
coordination in the EU. 
 
Evolutionary Ties of Social Policy and Corporate Rescue 
 
17 The persistence of social policy also influenced the very development of 
corporate rescue mechanisms that aim to preserve or rehabilitate a business and 
provided an additional feature underlying the overall rescue culture espoused 
throughout the EU. Prior to embracing the rescue culture in the UK, the aims of 
insolvency were quite simple: to replace the chaos occasioned by the pursuit of 
individual claims with a statutory regime suspending contractual rights and 
remedies while a mechanism provides for the orderly collection and realisation of 
assets and their distribution among creditors in accordance with a statutory scheme 
of distribution.
32
 The primary objectives of corporate insolvency law in England are 
geared toward maximising the return to creditors, whether this is through returning 
a company to profitable trading or dealing with the company’s assets in such a way 
that creditors are able to regain the best possible return on their financial claims.
33
 
By the 1980s, a more social approach to insolvency had developed among Western 
nations which left scope for, and indeed justified, rescue activities according to the 
individual values contained within the corporate rescue principles of each 
jurisdiction.
34
 Indeed, if aims remained the maximisation of returns for creditors, 
there would be no need for corporate rescue. By definition, it considers factors 
outside of the realm of the goals of the corporation. 
 
18 The aims of insolvency in the UK were tempered by some element of social 
consideration first by the introduction of administration in the Insolvency Act 
1986
35
 and then in 2002 with the introduction of more socially oriented procedures 
that aimed to rescue a business as a priority.
36
 One of Cork’s37 primary concerns in 
introducing the administration procedure was the plight of the unsecured creditor, 
who generally received nothing in traditional insolvency procedures. The 
underlying feature of corporate rescue procedures is that they would also have a 
role in protecting jobs due to the continuance of the company and the various 
directives protecting employees affected by the business in either financial distress 
or in processes of restructuring. Cork’s broad policy was aimed at the rehabilitation 
of the company and while the 1986 Act did not go as far as he perceived was 
necessary to achieve this end, the 2002 Act succeeded in implementing more 
                                                 
32 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (2005, Sweet and Maxwell, London), at 5. 
33 Ibid., at 39. 
34 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2009, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge), at 245-246. 
35 1986 c. 45. 
36 Enterprise Act 2002 (2002 c. 40). 
37 K. Cork, Sir (Chairman), Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (1982) 
Cmnd. 8558. 
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effective rehabilitative procedures.
38
 
 
19 The 2002 Act also provided a greater degree of preference for employees in the 
distributions of insolvency, indicating another social matter imposed upon the 
economic purity of insolvency procedures. Though traditionally insolvency law has 
had other interests to look to, matters of fairness have now been accepted as 
necessary considerations in the UK insolvency system. Among these considerations 
are the ranking of wages as preferential debts, access to social security for 
repayment of arrears, rules dealing with continuity of employment and laws 
stipulating the mandatory transfer of contracts on the transfer of a business as a 
going concern.
39
 The latter of these protections is derived from EU law, but has 
been in existence elsewhere in continental Europe for decades. In particular, social 
policy issues such as the application of acquired rights are fundamental factors 
influencing the regulatory style in France. 
 
20 In France, the aims of insolvency have encompassed social policy matters from 
prior to the time when the EU began to push toward rescue. The emphasis on social 
policy encouraged a move to the maintenance of businesses over liquidation. The 
harmful effects of unemployment caused by business failures in recessionary times 
were an influence on the creation of a corporate rescue policy heavily biased 
toward the protection of employment and the rehabilitation of the business.
40
 The 
French system exhibits redistribution tendencies that are characteristic of its version 
of social democracy. The French perspective of insolvency is as a collective 
procedure designed to distribute loss among all stakeholders in a company, subject 
to a certain hierarchy of distribution where employees are often privileged over 
creditors.
41
 Its reform in the 1980s had the essential objective of protecting 
employment at the risk of sacrificing creditors’ rights. Creditors’ rights were made 
secondary to the preservation of the business in difficulty and the jobs dependent 
upon it.
42
 This approach was later viewed as too biased in favour of labour and 
unsuited to allowing the French economy to evolve in the highly competitive global 
market.
43
 
 
21 While more recent reforms have softened the draconian treatment of creditors 
relative to employees, the objective of protecting employment continues to affect 
the way in which courts deal with specific insolvency cases. There is an underlying 
goal of preserving employment in the French system. Compromises are sometimes 
made between the social and financial objectives in the sale of businesses as going 
                                                 
38 V. Finch, above note 34, at 754-779. 
39 Ibid., at 15. 
40 A. Sorensen and P. Omar, Corporate Rescue Procedures in France (1996, Kluwer Law 
International, London), at 26. 
41 P. Omar, European Insolvency Law (2004, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot), at 129. 
42 J. Silkenat and C. Schmerler, The Law of International Insolvencies and Debt Restructurings (2006, 
Oceana Publications, New York), at 143. 
43 Idem. 
  Gant: Path-Dependent Obstacles 111 
 
concerns.
44
 The social objectives of employment protection and the attendant costs 
effectively reduce the value of a business being sold; thereby reducing the 
distributions available to creditors, though this is often acceptable due to the French 
emphasis on workers’ rights and job security. 
 
22 The fundamental aims of insolvency in the UK and France differ, primarily in 
respect of the applicable social objectives. Though similar terms to describe 
elements of procedure may be used, the ideologies and policies informing the 
objectives of those procedures result in an asynchronous meaning, creating a 
barrier to mutual understanding and an obstacle to coordinated action. The question 
remains then as to how it may be possible to find a means of coordinating the law 
in order to pursue a more successful environment for cross-border business. In 
discovering the influences on the aims of socially oriented regulation it may be 
possible to identify areas where coordination and perhaps convergence may be 
realistically attempted and to work around those areas in which the different social 
aims make such convergence impossible or at least improbable in the near future. 
 
23 In order to identify the influences on the aims of socially oriented regulation as 
it affects insolvency and corporate rescue, certain specifically selected paths of 
regulatory development will be discussed in the following sections. The historical 
economic context is fundamentally important as social policies are inextricably 
linked to the economic systems within which they are found. Therefore, there will 
first be a description of the economic history of both jurisdictions before moving on 
to historical path development of industrialisation; proletarianisation of the working 
classes; idiosyncrasies of the employment relationship; collectivism and labour 
movements; and the evolution of labour regulation. Each of these historical 
developments have an impact on the evolution of social policy, which has a 
significant impact on the balance struck between the individual and the business, or 
in terms of this endeavour, the balance between the aims of social policy and the 
aims of corporate rescue and insolvency. 
 
 
Paths of Regulatory Development in Labour 
 
Labour is not a Commodity 
 
24 It has long been recognised that differences in labour regulation between 
sovereign states is an obstacle to competition. Jacques Necker, financial minister to 
Louis XIV, argued that abolishing Sunday working would interfere with France’s 
ability to compete in the international market. Robert Owen, grandfather of British 
labour law, in 1818 petitioned the powers that were at that time for a continent wide 
                                                 
44 R. Stevens, “Comments and Discussion Report”, in W-G. Ringe, L. Gullifer and P. Thery (eds), 
Current Issues in European Financial and insolvency Law: Perspectives from France and the UK 
(2009, Hart Publishing, Portland), at 207-210. 
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regulation of working hours in order to achieve fair competition, while achieving 
some social justice for workers. Further, the constitution of the International 
Labour Organisation states that the failure of any nation to adopt humane 
conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations who desire to 
improve the conditions in their own countries.
45
 While it can be generally conceded 
that among Western European countries working conditions are generally humane, 
there remain discrepancies in how far each country goes on to ensure worker safety, 
autonomy and job security. 
 
25 Labour law evolved in part to deal with the fact that the services provided by 
individuals cannot be separated from the person providing it. Though treated as a 
commoditized factor of production in explanations of a free market economy by 
classical economists, labour does not exhibit the normal qualities of a commodity. 
It is not purely subject to the law of supply and demand as, at least in modern times, 
workers often bargain in such a way that the balance between supply and demand in 
the labour market are compromised in order to improve their working lives. The 
only way labour could be and remain a commodity would be to regulate its ability 
to act on its own behalf, which for a long period of time is exactly what 
governments did to ensure uninhibited competition in the labour market to protect 
capitalism. The employee is also naturally subordinated by an employer in terms of 
relative power due to the organisational methods, capital ownership, priority of 
interests, as well as the economic dependency of the employee. The asymmetry of 
this relationship means that employers are able to essentially dictate employment 
terms that an employee will be forced to accept as the alternative may be 
unemployment.
46
 This imbalance in the bargaining position of the contractual 
parties to the employment relationship is addressed by modern labour regulation in 
both jurisdictions. 
 
26 During the 1980s, the substantial protections for labour interests and collective 
laissez faire in the UK underwent a rapid decline due to the intensity of labour 
regulation. Reasons for this massive weakening of labour interests in the UK were 
of a political nature as a Conservative government had been elected on a policy of 
labour flexibilisation. During this period, union power and activities were having a 
significant effect on the UK’s ability to compete in the Common Market. The scope 
of collective laissez faire had come to provide significant power to industrial 
workers that often far outweighed the power of employers. The neo-liberal 
Conservative government recognised this as a problem for the UK’s place in the 
world economy and began to chip away at the strength of union power until it was 
all but replaced by minimally protective labour regulation that provided just enough 
succour to keep most workers from revolution. While the opt in of the UK to the 
                                                 
45 B. Hepple, “New Approaches to International Labour Regulation” (1997) 26(4) Industrial Law 
Journal 353-366, at 356. 
46 A. Goldin, “Global Conceptualisations and Local Constructions”, in G. Davidov and B. Languille 
(eds), The Idea of Labour Law (2011, Oxford University Press, Oxford) 69-87. 
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EU Social Charter by the Labour government in 1997 and its subsequent enactment 
of the raft of European labour law further mitigated the losses of labour in the 
1980s, the power of the unions would never recover. 
 
27 France underwent contrasting developments when in the 1980s the Auroux laws 
instituting labour law reforms were enacted under the socialist government. And 
while more conservative elements of the French government have mitigated the 
extent of protection afforded at that time, levels of employment protection has 
remained high.
47
 The nineties and noughties have seen developments on an EU 
level that have affected both the UK and France, though most of these 
developments were already present in France to some degree. Following the 
financial and sovereign debt crisis, there was a general recoil from EU legal 
supremacy as Member States looked to their own critical internal problems. While 
it has been officially recognised that a general flexibilisation of the labour market 
would provide a reasonable means of achieving economic recovery, every EU 
Member State has approached this in different ways according to their particular 
perspective on social, economic and employment rights. Thus rather than coming 
closer in the last several years, labour regulation among the Member States has 
actually diverged in many ways, though some have been forced into regulatory 
submission due to the loans provided by EU and international funding institutions. 
The fact that draconian de-regulation, austerity requirements and a catastrophic 
sovereign debt crisis have been necessary to draw some jurisdictions into closer 
regulatory alignment demonstrates how under similar circumstances, countries at 
similar developmental stages can react quite differently. However, some may also 
agree that the variance in apparent developmental levels within the EU has not been 
helpful in this economic climate. 
 
28 One may ask why it is that across Europe social policy issues remain such a 
sensitive subject when viewed in parallel with EU Treaty goals of harmonisation as 
well as the effects of the financial crisis. While there are a number of reasons why 
this may be the case, it is submitted that social policy in some states, such as the 
UK, is exogenous to the legal system while social policy in others, such as France, 
is endogenous. As such any legislation which will impact on society in some way 
will have social considerations in France that might not be recognised as requiring 
consideration within UK law unless imposed upon it from outside the norms of the 
legal system as evidenced by the frequent resistance the UK has had to EU social 
policy legislation while France has often provided a catalyst for its creation. The 
degree to which social policy issues influence the regulatory style of a jurisdiction 
can be explained to some extent by an examination of those historical factors that 
led up to the varied regulation concerning economic and social matters particularly 
in the context of industrialisation. In order to appropriately contextualise the social 
aspects of this investigation, some economic context is first required. 
 
                                                 
47 Deakin, Lele and Siems, above note 15, at 145-146. 
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Economic Systems and Policy 
 
29 The economic history of a country often begins with the firs recognition of land 
ownership by individuals and its commoditisation. During the Middle Ages, 
England was the more economically progressive of the two jurisdictions, though the 
term “progressive” should not be viewed as a subjectively positive descriptor. 
English progressiveness was accompanied by varying degrees of violence, 
deprivation and social discord. The treatment of landholding in England differed 
from that of France since the time of the Norman Conquest
48
 when the policy of 
“nulle terre sans seigneur”49 was imposed, resulting in the reversion of all English 
lands into royal property and distributed in such a way as to strengthen the royal 
Norman government.
50
 Feudal France was largely decentralised by the sixteenth 
century with landholding residing in the feudal lords of the provinces, each holding 
absolute power over their particular jurisdiction. While the power of the French 
crown was officially centralised in the sixteenth century, in reality the land 
remained under the ownership of large landholders or became the property of the 
bourgeoisie through purchase. The mutual obligations of feudalism had broken 
down, however, and the nobles no longer held a power that rivalled the king.
51
 
 
30 During the time of Henry VIII,
52
 land ownership acquired new motive and 
meaning. The dissolution of the monasteries freed vast tracts of land and property 
which could be sold by the crown to the highest bidder. The sale of property for 
commercial gain was the catalyst for the commoditisation of land. Landowners now 
viewed their estates as potential commercial assets to be exploited for profit, rather 
than a means to support whole communities on a traditional communal level.
53
 The 
enclosure
54
 of common lands became a profitable expedient for commercially 
minded landowners. The English pseudo-feudal system was being replaced by the 
laws of the market. Custom was replaced by law and contract while communal 
production was being supplanted by competition. The corporatized farmers 
benefitting from enclosure wished to sell their produce to the rising populations of 
                                                 
48 11th century invasion and occupation of England by an army of Norman, Breton and Frank soldiers 
led by William the Conqueror (Duke William II of Normandy) culminating in the Battle of Hastings on 
14 October 1066 when the King of England, Harold Godwinson, brother-in-law to King Edward the 
Confessor, was defeated and killed by William’s forces. 
49 Translates as “no land without a lord” or “no property without a liege” and refers to the feudal law 
principle that a person provides services to his sovereign, usually by serving in the army, in return for 
the right to receive land from the sovereign. 
50 R. Allen Brown, Origins of English Feudalism (1973, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London), at 33-
82. 
51 C. Jenkins, A Brief History of France: People, History and Culture (2011, Constable and Robinson 
Limited, London), at 26-45. 
52 Reigned from 1509-1547. 
53 C. Hibbert, The English: A Social History 1066-1945 (1987, Guild Publishing, Glasgow), at 177. 
54 Enclosure refers to the process in England of fencing land that had previously been used under 
traditional rights of common land for grazing and arable farming and deeding that land to one or more 
owners who would then be solely entitled to use the land. 
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towns and cities while smaller farmers were reduced to subsistence farming in small 
tenancies reliant on the landowner’s willingness to continue the lease. Land was no 
longer managed in a way that required the mutuality of communal social 
responsibility.
55
 The English people were beginning to view profit as an appropriate 
ambition and began to work towards more capitalistic goals. 
 
31 Land was commoditized as theological attitudes toward money and industry 
changed, first in England in the sixteenth century and later in France precipitated by 
the ideals of the French Revolution.
56
 This was made possible in part through the 
separation of the political from the spiritual after the power of the Church was 
usurped in both countries, Church lands confiscated and used for profit and 
rationalism overtook the predominate outlook of great leaders. The economy was 
no longer structured on custom and tradition but on the quest for economic profit.
57
 
Despite the deprivations suffered by many, the expansion of a money based 
economy encouraged social mobility. The commercial classes were strengthened 
and an embryonic form of capitalism was growing,
58
 along with an interest in 
commercial and industrial innovation aimed at expanding and increasing the 
efficiency and profit trade. Though both countries steadily became more secular in 
nature, if not in form, they did so from different religious contexts. France 
remained Catholic while the UK had espoused a Tudor Protestantism. These 
differences also had an effect on legal evolution, particularly in relation to views on 
debt and social protection. 
 
32 Capitalist motivations did not become common in France until the late 
nineteenth century. In fact, even following the French Revolution, going into 
business carried a social stigma even for the bourgeoisie, whose aim in making 
money was not for the sake of profit or investment, but generally in order to have 
enough to live an idle life and perhaps to purchase official positions. These goals 
are very much ancien régime principles that, though defeated in the aristocracy 
during the violence of the Revolution, were revived by the rising bourgeoisie who 
failed to grasp the benefits of true capitalism. They generally preferred to withdraw 
from business once personal goals were achieved, rather than beginning the large 
dynastic enterprises common in England and the United States. 
 
33 Mercantilism also remained the dominant economic policy in France for some 
time. Mercantilism was an economic system that preceded capitalism and referred 
to the conviction that in order to prosper, states should manipulate every available 
advantage to create the best environment for prosperity. This was essentially the 
                                                 
55 P. Ackroyd, The History of England Volume II: Tudors (2012, Pan Books, London), at 22-24 and 
207. 
56 Period of political and social upheaval that lasted from 1789 to 1799 resulting in the abolition of the 
French monarchy and the establishment of a secular and democratic republic. 
57 D. Goldman, Globalisation and the Western Legal Tradition: Recurring Patterns of Law and 
Authority (2007, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), at 163 and 165-166. 
58 N. Davies, Europe: A History (1997, Pimlico, London), at 517. 
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opposite of the laissez-faire principles adopted by eighteenth century classical 
economists, several of whom were French in origin. The mercantilist system 
discouraged imports through financial restrictions while encouraging exports and 
promoting manufacturing at home. It concerned itself with strengthening the 
sources of economic power while suppressing competition with economic rivals.
59
 
Mercantilism was not able to support the economic growth for which it had been 
instituted, however. In the early eighteenth century, a conviction grew that 
economic life could not progress further unless states discontinued the application 
of artificial curbs and restrictions on trade. In France in particular, revolutionary 
notions of social welfare were being voiced by notable physiocrats,
60
 who theorised 
that national economic prosperity could not be assured but through the personal 
prosperity and liberty of all.
61
 
 
34 Late seventeenth century Britain was receptive to changes to social and trading 
systems as it had achieved a fairly stable compromise following the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688.
62
 Rather than a violent revolution led by disenfranchised and 
mistreated peasants and the middle class, this English revolution was bloodless and 
politically motivated, though with ostensibly religious aims: to prevent absolutist 
and radical Catholicism from usurping the Protestant establishment. However, 
political power continued to reside in the hands of the gentry and while the 
economy changed from being agriculturally and based managed by rich landowners 
to an industrial society dominated by industrial and financial capitalists, its success 
was all achieved within a constitutional framework of parliamentary supremacy. 
The power of the rich were further evidenced in the labour laws passed in 1799 and 
1800 that repressed trade unions and striking in order to protect the interests of 
employers.
63
 
 
35 France experimented with early forms of capitalist endeavour at various times 
prior to the French Revolution. However, there was little interest in taking 
innovative or risky investment opportunities and the attitudes of the bourgeoisie 
who were able to afford it were risk averse and more interested in purchasing office 
positions under the ancien régime tradition. Despite the pre-Revolution progressive 
                                                 
59 Ibid., at 523. 
60 French enlightenment economists who believed that the wealth of nations derived solely from the 
value of land agriculture or development and that such products should be highly priced. See F. 
Quesnay, J. de Gournay, and J.P. Dupont de Nemours and J. Turgot. Physiocracy is an opposing theory 
to Mercantilism and preceded the first modern economic school of classical economics. 
61 Davies, above note 58, at 602. 
62 The Revolution of 1688 during which King James II was overthrown by a union of English 
Parliamentarians with Dutch Stadtholder William III of Orange who successfully invaded an unresisting 
England and ascended the throne, ensuring Protestant succession by displacing the Catholic heir 
apparent with William’s Protestant English wife, the daughter of King James. 
63 B. Hepple and P. O’Higgins, The Making of Labour Law in Europe: A Comparative Study of Nine 
Countries up to 1945 (1986, Hart Publishing, Portland), at 16-17. 
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ideas of Colbert,
64
 his innovative plans ended in bankruptcy despite his heroic 
attempts to avoid it.
65
 The actions of John Law
66
 evoked further hostility toward the 
idea of capitalist enterprise after his actions and those of his investors caused a 
market crash that led to a return to the old ways of security seeking and risk 
avoidance.
67
 These outcomes also led to a general hostility toward paper money 
that continued until the nineteenth century when France finally established a 
modern banking system.
68
 The attitudes of the bourgeoisie of this period are 
reflective of common risk-averse and anti-capitalist attitudes which remain present 
in France today and are reflective of the slow and often resistant progress of 
industrialisation. 
 
The Industrial Revolution: Opposing Viewpoints 
 
36 The countries of the EU all underwent capitalist industrialisation at different 
times and under different political conditions during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. While there are many differences in the historical characteristics of the 
UK and France, some of the most significant and relevant differences emerged at 
the time of industrialisation.
69
 The Industrial Revolution led to the institution of 
formally free labour as workers were separated from the land and labour became a 
factor of production. Liberal economics insisted on the free exchange of all factors 
of production, including labour, which can be seen as a commoditisation of the 
human being. This was eventually tempered to a certain degree by the introduction 
of the welfare state, which provided a basis for organizing and spreading the risks 
inherent in the shift from agrarian to industrial society, particularly since wage 
labour had become the means of subsistence for a large majority of the 
population.
70
 
 
37 There are a number of characteristics peculiar to the British people, economy 
and even geography that contributed to its ability to grow its industry on a grander 
scale than its continental neighbours. The genius of practical craftsmen coupled 
with underemployed capital, cheap labour and new techniques of mass production 
                                                 
64 1619-1683; French politician who served as the Minister of Finances under King Louis XIV who 
improved the state of French manufacturing and tried to save the French economy, though the king’s 
war expenditure made this impossible. 
65 C. Seignobos translated from French by C. A. Phillips, A History of the French People (1933, 
Jonathan Cape Limited, London), at 249. 
66 A Scottish economists who was the Controller General of Finances of France under the Duke of 
Orleans (regent for Louis XV) responsible for the Mississippi Bubble by exaggerating the wealth of 
Louisiana, leading to wild speculation on shares that ended in chaotic economic collapse in France. 
67 Jenkins, above note 51, at 87. 
68 Idem. 
69 Hepple and O’Higgins, above note 63, at 5-6. 
70 S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment and 
Legal Evolution (2005, Oxford University Press, Oxford), at 18-19. 
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and a Protestant work ethic helped to push Britain to world economic leadership.
71
 
There were a range of new inventions and thousands of patents taken out in the late 
eighteenth century.
72
 The capital available from the building of the colonial empire, 
developments in agriculture and the cottage industry provided Britain with a large 
domestic and colonial consumer market. Its economy was also isolated from 
continental Europe during the Napoleonic wars, which further stimulated British 
industry.
73
 
 
38 As early as 1700, the English regions had already been effectively parcelled out 
into industrial provinces as certain areas specialised in certain industries, owing to 
specific conditions of the area. This led to a growth of industrial towns according to 
their nature and was aided by improved methods of transportation for foodstuffs 
necessary for an increased population.
74
 While industry had been evolving in 
England since the fifteenth century, it was during the middle of the eighteenth 
century that marks the beginning of an industrial as well as a commercial revolution 
in Britain that occurred in advance of any other European economy.
75
 In 1760 two 
thirds of British people were still living in the country and agriculture was still the 
largest occupations; however, Britain was growing phenomenally at this stage.
76
 
Trade in the colonies had created the largest free trade area in the world while a 
new consumerism saw the rapid increase in demand for consumer goods.
77
 Thus, 
there was a need for large scale production, which industrialisation would seek to 
satisfy. Large populations of the countryside began to migrate into the cities to earn 
their living as factory workers.
78
 
 
39 The gathering of labourers into a single place of work also characterised the 
Industrial Revolution as well as the changes it entailed to the labour processes and 
locations. In those industries that utilised processes of rolling and smelting it was 
nearly impossible to produce on a small scale. The mechanical limitations of the 
riverside water wheel utilised in mills and for engines also required more people to 
gather in the location where the technology was available for use. Oversight in 
terms of fraudulent and negligent practices also required a less disparate workforce. 
Finally, the division of labour and specialisation required the presence of a number 
of labourers doing specific jobs which fit into a whole process, requiring each 
element of that job to be located in the same place.
79
 The Industrial Revolution was 
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partly cause and partly an effect of the division of labour and the extension of 
specialisation. These new production methods allowed unskilled workers to devote 
themselves to a single product or process on a repetitive basis as a single element of 
an overall industrial endeavour.
80
 
 
40 French industrialisation was undertaken with a different aim and focus than was 
British industrialisation. During the reign of Louis XVI,
81
 industrial production had 
been increased by the hand machines introduced from England and steam engines 
were coming to be used in the mines.
82
 However, the French reliance on foreign 
technology carried with it its own problems. It required that the foreign technology 
be aligned with local craft practices and expectations and the skills needed to 
operate foreign machines and systems were not always immediately present. French 
workshops and artisans of the eighteenth century evolved into small businesses and 
the petite bourgeoisie. France maintained a small scale industrial character during a 
period when rapid industrialisation was occurring throughout Western Europe. 
Instead of the decomposition of traditional trades, France remained a small scale 
producer until the twentieth century. Luxury and fashion trades remained the most 
common, which allowed for and indeed encouraged the continuance of small scale 
artisanal production. French exports were dominated by artefacts associated with 
the traditional luxury trades even until the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
83
 
While today French industry is competitive in the global economy, it is still known 
for its artisan and luxury trades produced by relatively traditional means. 
 
41 While the British quest for profit was king, there was less of a focus on money-
making in France than on how France would be able to adopt the industrial 
economy to the nature and culture of the French nation. While France lagged 
behind England in industrialisation generally, there were steady improvements 
during England’s period of rapid growth. Technical progress was also delayed by 
the turbulent and revolutionary nineteenth century as well as the Napoleonic wars.
84
 
Little changed during the twenty five years of revolutions, empires and restorations, 
but by the mid-nineteenth century, large scale industry had undergone a 
transformation on the English model. Machines fired by coal were being used, 
which changed the conditions of work for industrial labourers.
85
 
 
42 Wealth in France remained in real property throughout the nineteenth century. 
Merchants and industrialists were not rich as they were becoming in England. 
There were also hardly any rich employers of labour except in the textile and 
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83 M. Sonescher, Work and Wages: Natural law, politics and the Eighteenth Century Trades (1989, 
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mining industries. Large scale industry was not yet common and was only 
introduced as a result of the introduction of English textile manufacturing 
machinery as well as certain new chemical processes. While the power rested 
primarily in the bourgeoisie, they generally dreaded commercial and industrial 
enterprises in which money could be exposed to risk.
86
 The memory of the bursting 
of the Mississippi Bubble was still clearly present and influencing French 
investment choices. 
 
43 Thus, France took a steady approach toward industrialisation. There was first a 
massive expansion of industry in the countryside relying on small scale cottage 
production that laid the groundwork for large scale industrialisation. Peasants in the 
countryside relied upon their cottage industries during the slow agricultural 
seasons, which helped to compensate them for excessive divisions of landholdings 
or the precarious existence of tenant farmers and agricultural labourer. Merchant 
manufacturers were content to exploit this ready supply of labour. This form of 
industrial organisation was a resilient French system. However, this type of proto-
industrial economy would not be able to keep up with competitors so would have to 
transition to a more scientifically and technologically dynamic economy in the 
nineteenth century.
87
 
 
44 The quality of French industrialisation was also characterised by a form of 
flexible specialisation aimed to develop increasingly sophisticated versions of 
artisan tools for the use of skilled labour. The new machinery still made heavy 
demands on the skills of the operative, unlike specialisation in British industry that 
mainly required repetitive small tasks of its unskilled labour force. The skill 
focussed specialisation was, however, well suited to the craft traditions of French 
labour by catering to creativity and quality. The flexible specialisation could not, 
however, replace the profit making ability of mass production, despite the fact that 
it likely produced higher quality and more diverse goods.
88
 France was slow to 
concentrate production but an increasing sub division of tasks eventually led to a 
de-skilling of the labour force. This de-skilling of certain sectors of the labour force 
reduced individual wages such that in comparison to those who continued to work 
in at least semi-skilled industries, income distribution was increasingly unequal. 
Such inequality of income distribution then acted as a drag on industrial 
consumption, decreasing economic growth.
89
 
 
45 Britain’s early industrialisation allowed the modern business enterprise to 
emerge before its legal system could move beyond late medieval and early modern 
forms of legal regulation. In France, private law codes had been introduced decades 
before large scale industrialisation occurred. These differences had profound 
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implications for both legal and economic development. In Britain, institutions had 
to hurry to catch up with the pace of industrialisation and evolved in order to suit 
its requirements while in France institutions such as the employment contract and 
companies limited by share capital were already in place and able to support the 
emergence of large scale business enterprises.
90
 
 
Proletarianisation 
 
In the UK... 
 
46 Proletarianisation was the process whereby dependence upon the dictates of 
capitalist relations increased among the labouring classes. It was not solely the 
subordination of the labouring classes to a technically driven labour process, but a 
process occurring in the sphere of market relations that involved an increased 
exposure to the vagaries of market forces. Employees were less able to bargain with 
their employers and were more dependent than before on a single source of income, 
thus had to work on any terms they could achieve.
91
 Even before large scale 
industrialisation occurred, the English peasants were already dependent upon 
selling their labour power, thus the proletarianisation of the English had begun in 
advance of the Industrial Revolution.
92
 Two thirds of the rural and urban labour 
force was wage earning and rent paying as early as the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century.
93
 Small craftsmen still in the workshop industry steadily 
became more dependent upon the industrialist machinery of the large factories. As 
small craftsmen were unable to compete effectively with the larger manufactories 
they were reduced to performing certain limited stages of production as 
subcontractors to the large producers. The small producers’ reliance on the credit 
granted by the larger manufactories increased their dependence. Competition 
between small workshops also led to lowering working standards and wages as well 
as the adoption of tightened discipline among employees.
94
 
 
47 The saturation of the labour market by unskilled workers as well as the 
introduction of machinery led to a process of deskilling of the labour supply. 
Specialisation and division of labour had further simplified industrial processes, 
making it easier for workers to move from one occupation to another.
95
 
Specialisation was fed by these unskilled workers and contributed to the dissolution 
of traditional household economy as women and children entered into direct 
competition with men. Wages reduced as competition rose in the labour market.
96
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Peasant men and women came to live crowded together earning their living as units 
of the labour force in factories rather than as communal groups of families and 
neighbours working together to produce from the land. Labour had become more 
mobile and flexible and opportunities were now made available, promising higher 
standards of comfort to those able to relocate.
97
 There was no strong desire among 
those who would become factory hands to congregate in large industrial centres. 
Rather, they were under the spell of powerful economic forces that transformed 
them into a working class.
98
 
 
48 Initially, it was rare for workers to seek continuity of work as casual hiring 
methods engendered casual working habits. Essentially, workers sought work when 
funds were needed to satisfy the needs of the worker and his family. The preference 
of leisure time and the fact that most workers were paid by the piece led to the 
rapid and sometimes negligent or substandard production of goods in order to gain 
the cash in as little time spent working as possible. This led to requirements of 
working hours and eventually to the widespread use of employment contracts which 
would stipulate standards, hours and wages. Eventually, workers became inured to 
the regularity of work, although the process of conditioning the labour force to 
stricture rules of working was difficult and unpleasant. However, had code of 
conducts and working rules not been imposed during the early days of the Industrial 
Revolution, there could have been no factory system or rise in output that led to an 
improvement in working conditions during the nineteenth century.
99
 
 
49 Proletarianisation was a complex process of interaction between a growing 
subdivision of labour stimulated by market demand, the expansion of the labour 
market and the appearance of boom and slump trading cycles. Trading cycles 
encouraged the movement between trades and the abandonment of customary 
protections such as apprenticeships. Slumps in the market allowed standards and 
wages to reduce while workers and small contractors suffered increased 
dependence upon single large masters.
100
 What is peculiar to the UK is that while 
there were no formal classes, traditional reciprocities, obligations, cultural and 
social relationships nonetheless coexisted with economic forms of capitalism.
101
 
 
In France... 
 
50 Women and child labourers were used in the end of the eighteenth century for 
mechanical unskilled work in both manufactories and mechanised industry. In 
France, manufacturing had been changed in that it was now done on a large scale 
under the supervision of foremen. Workers were regarded merely as instruments for 
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performing work and industrialists kept a distant relationship with them. Their 
conditions of life, food, housing and health were of no concern. Wages were 
reduced to the lowest possible level in order to decrease the cost of production. 
Workers were recruited among the most destitute class of people in the poorest 
regions where an increase of population had produced a surplus having no means of 
subsistence in order to take advantage of their desperation. There was no security in 
employment and not enough money was made to save for the future of working 
families. Life was miserable, crowded, dirty and unhealthy. Work was monotonous, 
often dangerous, and the work day was unlimited.
102
 
 
51 Where once a person’s occupation was a part of their social standing and indeed 
their family and personal identity, such large scale industrial work had reduced the 
humans providing labour to commoditized elements of production. Workers forged 
no links with their workplace. There were no common traditions or organisations 
for mutual aid. Associations were still forbidden so the only means to improve their 
situation was illegal. They were completely dependent upon their employer who 
fixed their wages and working hours arbitrarily. Employers had no responsibility 
toward their employees if they fell ill or were injured as a result of the work they 
did for him.
103
 However, the heavy industrial sector of France did not replace the 
traditional, but rather developed alongside it. 
 
52 The industrial proletariat in France evolved slowly. Industry was initially 
divided into a small modern sector and a traditional one based on home craft 
activities. Industry was thus populated by a mass of small peasant owners and a 
large number of independent handicraftsmen spread out among the rural areas and 
within the budding industrial centres. There was no massive transfer from rural to 
urban centres that characterised industrialisation in the UK. There was instead a 
slow development of a diversified proletariat by successive strata of a non-
homogenous population from different socio-economic backgrounds constituted by 
successive waves of farm hands, part time peasants, migrant workers, women 
leaving home for work, craftsmen and former self-employed handicraftsmen. The 
proletariat was therefore composed of a diverse working class.
104
 
 
The Employment Relationship 
 
53 The British employment relationship was based on a master and servant model 
connected to the early legal form of social relations that was a statutory and 
hierarchical paradigm rather than based in contract and common law. This 
hierarchical form can be traced from the pseudo-feudal roots of the British classist 
society and the inherent conservatism of the populace, who later became the 
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industrial working classes. The master and servant form of employment relationship 
relied upon a command relation with an open ended duty of obedience imposed on 
the worker, reserving far reaching disciplinary powers to the employer.
105
 Even 
once the employment relationship had been given the status of contractual 
relationship imposing certain civil obligations, the hierarchical characteristic of the 
traditional master and servant model were carried over into the contractual 
employment relationship.
106
 Legal terminology and the old assumptions of 
unmediated control continued to be applied by the courts as they developed the 
common law of employment. The advent of the welfare state and the extension of 
collective bargaining caused employment law to change direction, but the 
traditional hierarchy of employer and employee remained difficult to dislodge from 
the legal psyche.
107
 While this has been tempered since the 1940s and given legal 
status following the introduction of the Employment Rights Act of 1996 as well as 
other more progressive employment oriented legislation, the master and servant 
approach is still evident in Britain’s regulatory approach to employment law.108 
 
54 The French employment relationship began with a similar approach to that of 
the UK. Labour contracts were initially grouped among other types of contracts, 
thus also based on exchanges within the market, effectively commoditising labour 
by linking it with price through the institution of contract. In the early legal codes, 
the concept of the subordination of the worker was absent, though this concept 
would come to define the French employment relationship. The practical reality 
was that an employer had the power to give orders, issue binding rules, and even 
retain the worker in employment until the employer considered that the work was 
complete. The contrat du travail
109
 entered into general usage in the 1880s due to 
an argument by larger enterprises that a general duty of obedience should be read 
into all industrial recruitment. Eventually, the contrat du travail would be promoted 
and systematised by those charged with developing the conceptual framework for 
collective bargaining and worker protection. The contrat du travail would become 
the core of the French employment relationship, the central pillar of which was the 
principal of subordination in which the employee’s duty of obedience was 
exchanged for the acceptance and absorption by the enterprise of a range of social 
risks.
110
 
 
55 The master and servant relationship prevailed in Britain until quite recently and 
its echoes can still be observed in the nature of British labour and employment 
regulation. Its continued existence was due in part to the parallel existence of 
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capitalist enterprise and the fading pseudo-feudal tradition. Eighteenth century 
social relations continued to be characterised by reciprocities, obligations, cultural 
and social relationships that were customary and traditional in character. At the 
same time, the objective conditions of production had created a class of industrial 
workers who remained emotionally and mentally tied to the traditions of class, if 
not the class structure and its distinctions. As demand for industrial products grew, 
restraints on the market left over from the days of mercantilist economics fell away. 
The working classes were increasingly dependent upon the dictates of capitalist 
relations and were steadily subordinated to it. By the end of the eighteenth century, 
workers had less power to bargain with their employers than they had in 1700. 
They were dependent on a single source of income and therefore were forced to 
work on whatever terms they could get.
111
 
 
56 The late appearance of a more equitable concept of the employment relationship 
in the UK had the effect of institutionalising the conception of the enterprise as the 
employer’s unencumbered property. The new economic relationship of employer 
and employee was based upon a concept of private property (capital) provided by 
the employer for the employee to be used in order to perform the services for which 
he is being paid. The employee became wholly dependent upon the industrial 
employer, in some cases for food, shelter and the education of his children as well 
as for the tools and place of his trade.
112
 Continental concepts of work relations 
imposed a juridical equality between worker and employer which was embodied in 
the legal codes. In France, the employer’s control over employees was tempered by 
the development of mandatory social legislation.
113
 
 
Collectivism and the Labour Movements 
 
57 Although initially association for the purposes of exerting pressure on employers 
to improve the position of employees was forbidden, a leftover from the first, 
though negative, labour regulation in both England and France issued during the 
rise in the demand power of labour during the time of the Black Death, it was 
eventually freed in both countries. Labour movements had been viewed as an 
interference with the free market economy and though their prohibition was 
actually interference, it left labour to be regulated by market forces operating 
through voluntary contracts. Guild regulations and other obstacles were also swept 
aside. The work book system was introduced on the continent while Britain pursued 
penal sanctions against deserting workers. These persisted until the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century.
114
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58 Once suffrage was extended in 1867,
115
 the unyielding power of British 
industrialists began to be tempered by the will of the voting working classes. In the 
1870s the penal sanctions for quitting and prohibitions on the right to association 
were removed. Due to the fragmented proletariat in France, however, it wasn’t until 
the 1890s that similar freedoms were instituted. While in Britain, the new found 
freedom saw the evolution of unions and the power of collective bargaining, which 
eventually grew to obtain significant political power in the Labour Party, in France 
political influence, particularly by the Socialist party, was exercised as a means of 
achieving guarantees for more favourable working conditions. Collectivism itself 
was instituted in a top down fashion, while in the UK bargaining began at 
enterprise level.
116
 
 
Labour in Britain 
 
59 In Britain, a principle of collective laissez faire was espoused that allowed 
employee organisations to bargain freely within the labour market with minimal 
government or regulatory interference. Thus, any mechanisms or procedures 
created before the middle of the twentieth century were implemented through trade 
unions and the institutions of collective bargaining. For employees in Britain this 
meant that the participants in industrial relations played a much more important 
role in the regulation of their own activities than they would have done in a more 
interventionist regime.
117
 For example, in the early twentieth century Britain viewed 
the duty to regulate or otherwise control working hours as belonging solely to the 
remit of collective bargaining and was therefore unwilling to ratify the International 
Labour Organisations Convention on the forty eight hour work week.
118
 Direct 
regulation of the employment relationship was not a matter for law, but for the 
social institutions of industrial relations.
119
 
 
60 The collective laissez faire preferred in Britain limited the intervention of the 
law to those marginal areas where there was a disparity between the forces of 
organised labour and organised management that impeded the successful operation 
of the negotiating machinery.
120
 Even where such disparity existed, labour 
regulation was light. The collective bargaining system evolved independently of the 
law and little was done to regulate or even recognise the legal standing of trade 
unions and their bargains. However, despite the free reign of unionist bargaining in 
the UK, individual rights were not necessarily protected. Individuals could be 
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discriminated against by trade unions on the basis that they were not a member. 
Further, the purpose of the collective agreement often lay within the control of the 
employers and unions thus did not confer an entitlement to protection upon 
individual employees.
121
 Individual protection did not arise until the 1960s when 
statutory regulation was passed to protect employees from unfair dismissal.
122
 This 
was the first step made by the UK away from the policy of collective laissez faire 
toward direct statutory regulation of the employment relationship, which was soon 
accompanied by a steady erosion of the free reign of labour interests that had 
become a serious impediment to the British free market economy. 
 
61 The growth of the union culture and collective bargaining in Britain in the early 
twentieth century was characterised by a lack of demand for changes to the law. 
Rather than using the law as a means of securing better conditions, higher wages 
and other employment benefits, British unions had discovered a better, more 
flexible means of looking after their members.
123
 The apolitical nature of unions 
during the early days of collectivism in Britain is one of the major differences 
between the development of unionism in the UK as opposed to in France. French 
unionism developed simultaneously with a mass political labour movement and its 
political parties. In Britain, the trade union organisation came first and the political 
movement later. The lack of political association of the early British labour 
movements led to agitation for a protected space within which trade unions could 
collectively bargain and negotiate without the interference of politics or even the 
law, which justified the principal of collective laissez faire as a basis for British 
labour interests.
124
 
 
62 While the function of trade union rights in the UK is similar to those of other 
continental democracies; the form that they take has traditionally been radically 
different. Rather than protecting the freedom of association through the granting of 
positive rights, the UK has generally granted immunities for certain trade union 
activities that could otherwise constitute civil law liabilities,
125
 such as conspiracy. 
Although strike action is “immune” from prosecution, striking employees will 
usually be taking action in breach of their employment contract, for which they 
could be sued by their employers.
126
 While such action by employers is rare, the 
fact that it is possible again emphasises the importance British courts and law 
makers place on the sanctity of freedom to contract. 
 
63 The resistance to regulation in the area of labour law in the UK is influenced by 
the nature of the labour movement in Britain. Given the development of trade 
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unions outside the political sphere and the far reaching freedom to act that they 
were given through immunities, it is not surprising that they were not supportive of 
the encroachment of the law into industrial policy. Britain’s adherence to orthodox 
economic beliefs in the free market, collective laissez faire and the lack of political 
ambitions to affect legislative policy in early unionist dogma meant that there was 
little support for any progressive labour regulation.
127
 This non-interventionist 
stance has remained popular in British politics, though successive Labour 
governments have tempered this with more progressive legislation, particularly in 
view of Britain’s acceptance of the EU Social Chapter. 
 
Labour in France 
 
64 Collective bargaining was also an important mechanism through which 
employment relations were managed in France, however, the legal systems 
recognised trade unions and also legally instituted enterprise level works councils. 
These generally involved the compulsory establishment of works councils and the 
election of representatives, placing a legal obligation upon the employer to give 
information to works councils and consult with it over matters of concern to 
employees. Continental works councils have the legal standing to compel the 
employer to treat his employees on a collective basis. While in Britain, the 
organisation of the workplace is based on the voluntary organisation of trade unions 
and their negotiations with employers, continental workplaces tended to be 
organised according to legal principles.
128
 
 
65 In France, the development of large scale industry and mechanisation in the 
framework of the capitalist system brought formerly isolated workshop labourers 
physically together within factories. Although a legal prohibition on collective 
organisation persisted into the middle of the nineteenth century, this new 
community of working class people allowed a collective consciousness of solidarity 
to emerge that led to worker organisation through which they could act to obtain 
guarantees previously lacking. It was in the 1840s that the misery and debilitating 
working conditions of the working classes was finally recognised in France. As 
industrialisation increased its pace along with the misery of the workers, liberal 
capitalism was blamed by a number of socially progressive groups as well as by the 
workers themselves.
129
 
 
66 While the Second Republic
130
 acknowledged the right to work, limited the 
working day to ten hours and created the forerunner to a ministry of labour, it 
remained suspicious of labour organisation. However, in 1864 the felony of 
                                                 
127 R. Lowe, “Hours of Labour: Negotiating Industrial Legislation in Britain, 1919-39” (1982) 35(2) 
The Economic History Review 254-271, at 270. 
128 Davies and Freedland, above note 117, at 16-17. 
129 Despax, Rojot and Laborde, above note 104, at 49-50, 194-195. 
130 1848-1852. 
  Gant: Path-Dependent Obstacles 129 
 
conspiracy which had often been used against collections of striking workers was 
eliminated, opening the way towards lawful strikes. The law of 1884 then repealed 
the existing texts contrary to trade union freedom, insured their independence from 
the state, and granted freedom to organise as well as to not belong to a union. The 
right to strike was later positively protected in the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic in 1946. It was also under this Constitution that works councils were 
introduced into the structure of private enterprises and a place was given to the 
representatives of employees.
131
 
 
67 The evolution stemming from the so-called “long nineteenth century” beginning 
with the French Revolution and ending with the commencement of World War I
132
 
left a deep mark which is still visible in the present labour regime. Early in the 
labour movement, there was no strict division of labour organisations between 
political and union activity. Social reformers, economists and political ideologues 
were all involved in the labour movement, rendering it fundamentally political in 
form.
133
 The labour movement took on a pluralistic character rather than as a 
unified labour movement that characterised the British process. Trade unions in 
France were divided along ideological lines. Thus, workers at a particular 
establishment could be members of different unions based on their political or 
philosophical affinity, such as Communist, Progressive, Socialist, or Christian or 
some other political or dogmatic confederation. However, trade union membership 
now attracts only a relatively small percentage of the workforce. This is in part due 
to the existence of enterprise level representation in work councils and employee 
representatives.
134
 The individualistic nature of France is also contrary to the 
inherent collectiveness in unionism, which may also contribute to the low 
membership. This does not stop the persistence of wildcat strike action and other 
forms of collective resistance or activism that is guaranteed under the human rights 
protections enshrined in the French Constitution and sacredly respected by the 
people. 
 
68 Labour policy has since become a tool of political power in the UK and France. 
The course of British Labour policy has been circuitous with far more violent 
swings in policy than was experienced in France. This can be explained in part 
through the more general social causes affecting each jurisdiction but also by 
reference to the legal culture itself. The British common law system is infinitely 
malleable in comparison to the French codified system
135
 and can thus be easily 
affected by political shifts. British Conservatism in the 1980s emphasised the need 
to free labour markets in order to compete in the global economy, which led to a 
substantial weakening of the power of labour interests in favour of its replacement 
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by regulation. As governments have changed between political parties so has the 
strength of labour regulation, making the area of employment law one of the least 
reliable and most changeable in the UK legal system. Similarly in France, as 
socialism gained ground in the 1980s, so too did labour reforms become 
increasingly protective, though not with the same alacrity as in Britain. In both 
jurisdictions, political changes are typically accompanied by changes to the 
protectiveness of labour law.
136
 
 
Labour Regulation 
 
69 Modern labour law is a product of industrialisation developed in view of certain 
social and economic factors that were prevalent early in the Industrial Revolution. 
It was developed for workplaces embedded in factories where employees worked in 
a collective manner. Continuity and stability were important factors in employment 
and businesses were characterised by clear hierarchical structures. There was a 
clear division between the employer’s power to command and control and the 
employee’s subordination to that power, a dichotomy that continues to define the 
scope of labour law today. However, in the post-industrial era that can describe the 
economies of most Western European countries, most of the elements of early 
industrial society no longer exist. Employees work in increasing isolation and the 
enterprise itself is no longer defined by location and building.
137
 
 
70 In Britain, labour regulation emerged long after the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution. It could be surmised that the implementation of labour law does not 
occur only as a result of the factors of production existing at the time, but actually 
reflects the economic and social structures of a jurisdiction.
138
 The modern cultural 
and social values in France have led to a liberal and social conception of labour 
law, giving a great role to the freedom of association and union activities, 
encouraging social dialogue and fighting against every form of discrimination. It 
also ensures widely guaranteed incomes either at work or in the case of 
unemployment.
139
 British labour regulation, however, was instituted only after the 
power of labour interests had grown to the point that they were able to wield real 
and damaging political power. Thus labour regulation was introduced first with 
broadly economic impulses aimed at replacing the power of labour interests in 
order to take control of the labour economy and later in order to meet minimum 
limits set by EU law. 
 
71 In the French system, the power of the state to regulate conditions of work was 
instituted within the legal system through the concept of ordre public social,
140
 a set 
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of minimum binding conditions applied as a matter of general law to the 
employment relationship. This concept recognised that as there should be a formal 
contractual equality between the parties of an employment relationship. Ensuring 
that this equality existed in practice meant that the state had to assume a 
responsibility for establishing a form of protection for individual workers who, by 
accepting employment, were placed in a position of subordination to employers.
141
 
Thus, the state assumed a role of calibration for the natural imbalance in power 
between employer and employee. Labour law differs from French civil law in that it 
takes the inequality of the contracting parties as the point of departure, while civil 
law assumes bargaining equality. Labour law also integrates a dimension for 
collective relations while civil law governs individual relationships based on the 
assumption that where an individual employee cannot bargain on an equal footing 
with an employer, then trade unions or other collective organisations can do so. The 
French labour law is therefore a special law operating alongside civil law that is 
then referred to in those instances where labour law does not cover certain 
circumstances.
142
 
 
72 Since the end of the 19th century, the degree of government intervention has 
been very important owing to the strength of its ideological and philosophical 
bases. Rather than the value that the British system places on freedom from 
government intervention, regulation was viewed as a means of liberating the 
oppressed, particularly those of the working classes. Further, France did not distrust 
the state or government intervention, unlike its neighbour across the channel who 
preferred to retain their regulation-free area within the sphere of trade unionism.
143
 
Rather, France has chosen the route of direct government regulation of the terms 
and conditions of employment for all employees, whether unionised or not. French 
labour organisations are also more politically oriented, having become accustomed 
to accomplishing their aims through political action rather than negotiation. 
Collective agreements themselves have occasionally become the subject of statute, 
eventually binding even those companies who did not agree to their terms.
144
 
 
73 France also introduced works councils following the end of World War II with 
the aim of associating the workers more closely with the functioning of the 
enterprise. Employers owe a number of duties to works councils to inform and 
consult with them on matters concerning the organisation, management and general 
running of the firm and in particular on any measures likely to affect the volume or 
structure of the work force, duration of work, employment, work and vocational 
training conditions.
145
 There is no similar organisation in the UK system. Though 
information and consultation exercises are required from time to time, these will 
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generally be with a representative group of employees especially comprised in 
order to meet the requirements of the exercise. In France, these work councils are a 
fundamental part of the labour law system. 
 
74 In the UK, an emphasis has remained on the importance of some form of 
economic liberalism and the free market, while France has steadily drawn away 
from these ideas toward the social democracy which is characteristic today. France 
has manifested a certain reserve about the market economy and capitalism through 
its political and economic policies.
146
 Clearly, the French system has taken a view 
on the importance of social protections and this view is imposed upon any 
legislative act which may affect society. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
75 Though both jurisdictions began with an economically liberal view on factors 
within the economy early in their times of industrialisation, the effect of France’s 
view on the rights of the worker and the importance of protecting individual dignity 
led to social policies becoming a fundamental tenet of their legal system. The 
acceptance of redistribution as a means of attaining justice and equality and the 
French resistance to capitalist economics makes regulation of social policy a moral 
requirement rather than a perceived economic hindrance. Social policy matters 
were subsumed within the foundations of the legal code, becoming a factor 
endogenous to the system which will always have an effect on the aims of 
regulation. Social policy in the UK came about as an afterthought drawn out by 
socially minded politicians and judges and eventually imposed through the exercise 
of EU legislative supremacy. While today social policy goals are a normal part of 
the UK political scene, the question in France is more about how far it can go 
without being a detriment to itself. 
 
76 The differing approaches to social policy are fed by factors relating to history, 
economy, society, culture and the idiosyncratic paths upon which labour systems 
evolved in the different jurisdictions. The manner of industrialisation is evidence of 
two very different approaches as well as different values placed upon tradition and 
culture over profitable gains. As Britain worshipped at the altar of mammon, 
feeding its industrial machine with the poor and dispossessed, France took a steady 
approach with greater care and consideration for the traditional industries already 
in place. The industrial proletariat was also differently composed, due in part to the 
enclosure of the English countryside which forced English peasants into industrial 
centres, an experience that did not occur in France. As such, the French proletariat 
was diverse leading to diverse approaches to the problems occasioned during 
industrialisation. 
 
                                                 
146 Ibid., at 33-34. 
  Gant: Path-Dependent Obstacles 133 
 
77 The character of the employment relationship is also demonstrative of the 
historical factors affecting the evolution of social policy. French feudalism, the 
absolute monarchy and then the catastrophic fall of the ancien régime have affected 
the way in which the employment relationship is viewed in France, taking from the 
pre-revolutionary context the subordinate nature of employees and the obligations 
of employers and the compassion and recognition of the need to balance this 
relationship from the ideals of the revolution itself. Britain, however, retains its 
master and servant style of contractual approach, placing the duty on both to 
comply with the contractual terms governing the relationship, but allowing each 
freedom to negotiate and to breach agreements without the intervention of 
regulatory provisions. 
 
78 The character of collectivism in the UK and France are fundamentally different. 
While France places an ultimate value on the freedom to associate and positively 
protects those rights, the UK has kept as much distance as possible while 
considering the effects of the power of collective labour interests on the economy in 
negative immunities. Though the balance of labour interests to labour regulation 
has changed today, the attitude of laissez faire is still present in the system. Further, 
France has legally integrated collective rights through the presence of works 
councils and employee representatives, a quality that arises in the UK only when 
certain events trigger the requirement for information and consultation. In addition, 
the nature of the working classes differs due to the historical experiences of each. 
The French proletariat tends to exhibit an individualism that can be traced back to 
the ideologies of the French Revolution which is evident in the pluralist nature of 
French trade unionism. The communitarian nature of the English working classes 
is, however, constitutive of a village community culture which was retained to some 
extent by the homogenous proletariat of the Industrial Revolution, making 
collective action more natural. 
 
79 Individualism and freedom are cornerstones of French society that arise 
throughout the history described herein. The importance of human dignity, 
pluralistic labour interests, the representative character of French business 
structures, and the heterogeneous nature of the proletariat that evolved during 
industrialisation are only an example of the elements of society and culture that 
have continually affected French legal culture. The UK is nearly opposite in all of 
these areas. While indeed freedom is valued, it is valued beyond the individual 
“rights” to comfort and dignity. Individuals are expected to look after themselves 
rather than relying on the state to ensure that businesses do not perpetrate abusive 
policies on workers. With these extraordinarily different characteristics in mind, it 
is not surprising that the centre of the French insolvency and corporate rescue 
regimes sits the protection of employment rather than of creditors, who are 
generally business entities. While France respects the separate personality of 
businesses, it is clear that they do not occupy the same space in terms of rights that 
individual humans do. 
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80 With differences so fundamental as these, it must be queried how it might be 
possible to overcome these obstacles in order to draw their legal systems into closer 
alignment, at least in relation to cross-border insolvency and the effect of 
employment protection on its efficiency. In order to find a common ground 
between the UK and France, it would be necessary to speak to the UK desire to 
promote business and the free market while considering the French requirement to 
protect individual employee interests with an understanding of the path dependent 
context influencing these positions. This would require a complete rethinking of the 
approach to coordination in legal reform, but one that might achieve more a more 
effective result. 
 
